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[‘Nervous shock’ was recognised as a recoverable form of injury in the early 1900s.  
Only recently however this form of injury has received extended coverage in the 
High Court of Australia and the legislature.  Unfortunately, there are few clear 
guidelines, especially from the High Court judgments.  This article discusses the 
implication of the recent decisions of Tame and Annetts and Gifford, as well as the 
history of ‘nervous shock’ and statutory developments.  It seeks to clarify the ap-
proach of the High Court and the legislature in the area of nervous shock, espe-
cially as it relates to recovery for ‘nervous shock’ by viewers of distressing events 
on television.] 
 
 
I INTRODUCTION 
In a litigious society, it is all too easy to regard as frivolous claims for psychiatric 
illness, especially when there is no accompanying physical injury.  After all, it is 
generally invisible to the untrained eye and seeing is believing.  Psychiatric injury 
(often referred to as ‘nervous shock’) is neither trivial nor frivolous and is now 
generally recognised by both the legal and medical professions as worthy of recov-
ery.  As Gummow and Kirby JJ noted in Tame and New South Wales and Annetts v 
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Australian Stations Pty Ltd,1 there have been advances in the capacity of medicine 
to objectively distinguish the genuine from the spurious.   
 
This topic is set to receive attention by the NSW Supreme Court, in Klein v New 
South Wales,2 following Master Harrison’s decision not to rule in favour of an 
application by the Defendant to strike out the Plaintiffs’ Statement of Claim.  The 
Plaintiffs were family members (i.e. parents, siblings, wife and sister-in-law) of 
Paul Klein, who was shot dead by the NSW police following a domestic distur-
bance.   
 
Paragraph 22 of the Statement of Claim pleaded that on the morning of 27 May 
1998 and on various occasions thereafter, each of the Plaintiffs saw on television 
and in the print media graphic images depicting the events leading up to and sur-
rounding the death of Paul Klein.  The Plaintiffs pleaded that the media representa-
tives were non-essential personnel present at the scene of the shooting of the 
deceased that exacerbated the danger to members of the public.  The alleged breach 
of duty was a failure to establish a perimeter around the scene to exclude all other 
than essential personnel, restrict access to the scene and to clear the area surround-
ing the perimeter.  
 
The Master allowed the matter to proceed to trial, and in refusing the dismissal 
application of the Defendant, he said: 
  
…the Court should be particularly astute not to risk stifling that develop-
ment of the law by summarily throwing out of court actions in respect of 
which there is a reasonable possibility that it will be found, in the devel-
opment of the law, still embryonic, that a cause of action does lie... One 
cannot predict, with firm assurance, what the future holds as the final for-
mulation of the new development.3  
 
This paper will explore the plight of people who suffer ‘nervous shock’ from view-
ing distressing events on television.  In cases such as these, loosely referred to as 
‘communicated or told nervous shock’, recovery is much more restrictive than 
‘psychiatric injury’ accompanied by physical injury.4  In the words of Associate 
Professor Danuta Mendelson, it is imperative that the law determines whether 
‘communicated nervous shock’ should be recoverable, especially given technologi-
cal advances in communication.5    
                                                        
* Articled Clerk, Abbott Stillman & Wilson. I would like to thank Associate Professor Danuta Mendel-
son, Deakin University, and Leanne Misquitta for reading my drafts and their constructive comments. 
 
1
 (2002) 211 CLR 317, 378 (‘Annetts’). 
2
 [2004] NSWSC 837 (‘Klein’) 
3
 Ibid 10. 
4
 Law Reform Committee, Commonwealth Parliament, Review of the Law of Negligence Final Report 
(2002) <http//revofneg.treasury.gov.au>. 
5
 Danuta Mendelson, The Interfaces of Medicine and Law – The History of the Liability for Negligently 
Caused Psychiatric Injury (Nervous Shock) (1998) 218.  
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Whilst the Australian High Court has addressed the issue of ‘communicated nerv-
ous shock’, as recently as June 2003,6 it has not had the opportunity to make a 
definitive finding on recovery by television viewers.  It is the author’s contention 
that despite authority to the contrary, especially in the UK, claimants in limited 
cases are likely to recover.  This proposition will be explored below. 
 
As a final introductory point, it is important to note that this paper will not explore 
medical evidence even though there is substantial medical evidence supporting 
recovery by claimants who are not present at the scene of the incident or its imme-
diate aftermath.7  Similarly, this paper will only consider claims against the original 
tortfeasor, rather than those who relay the news (such as television stations),8 and 
recovery for pure mental harm rather than mental harm consequential upon physical 
injury.  The author also accepts the proposition that recovery will only be allowed 
for recognisable psychiatric injury rather than sorrow or mere grief.9  Common law 
developments are discussed at length despite recent legislative enactment because 
the legislature, to a large extent, has taken its cue from the common law. 
 
Before discussing the history, it is important to briefly discuss the policy implica-
tions.   
 
II POLICY  
 
The policy reasons for allowing or disallowing recovery will only be discussed 
briefly because extensive material has already been published on policy matters in 
negligence and this paper endeavours to discuss the law rather than policy matters.10  
The Ipp Report addressed the reasons why the law has made it harder to recover for 
negligently occasioned psychiatric injury than physical injury.11  It felt the most 
important ones were – (i) the difficulty of proving the existence and extent of men-
tal harm; (ii) it would be harder to foresee the number of people who may suffer 
mental harm as opposed to physical harm; and (iii) because resources are limited, it 
is more important to compensate people for physical harm than for pure mental 
harm.   
 
                                                        
6
 Gifford v Strang Patrick Stevedoring Pty Ltd (2003) 214 CLR 269 (‘Gifford’). 
7
 Mendelson, above n 5, 230; Harvey Teff, ‘Liability for Negligently Inflicted Nervous Shock’ (1983) 99 
Law Quarterly Review 100, 107; Chris Tennant, ‘Liability for Psychiatric Injury: an Evidence-Based 
Appraisal’ (2002) 76(1) Australian Law Journal 73.  
8
 The author was dissuaded in exploring liability of television stations by conclusion of some respected 
writers that such liability is unlikely.  In particular see Des Butler, ‘Mass Media Liability for Nervous 
Shock: A Novel Test for Proximity’ (1995) 3 Torts Law Journal 75. 
9
 Des Butler, ‘Identifying the Compensable Damage in “Nervous Shock” Cases’ (1997) 5 Torts Law  
Journal 67.  
10
 See generally, Des Butler, ‘An Assessment of Competing Policy Considerations in Cases of Psychiat-
ric Injury Resulting from Negligence’ (2002) 10 Torts Law Journal 13. 
11
 Law Reform Committee, above n 4, 9.4. 
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One more relevant policy consideration, which is relevant to our discussion but not 
covered in the Ipp Report, is the ‘freedom of press’.  Dealing with this first, it has 
been put forward that holding the original tortfeasor liable will be a restriction on 
the freedom of the press.  The validity of this view is questionable for two reasons – 
 
(i) the claim is not being made against the television stations rather it 
is made against the original tortfeasor (in Klein the police officers 
and the State); and 
 
(ii) the issue is whether the original tortfeasor could have reasonably 
foreseen the ‘not insignificant’ risk that persons of a specific class 
would suffer psychiatric injury from viewing events, which were 
caused by its negligence, unfold on live television.  It is not 
whether the television stations were negligent in broadcasting the 
‘event’.          
 
Next, in this day and age it is inappropriate to rely on ‘floodgate’ arguments to 
prevent recovery.  First, it is now generally accepted both medically and legally that 
mental harm is equal to, and at times more detrimental than, physical harm.12  
Second, the floodgates are unlikely to open given that there are several limitations 
still applicable.  Not only does a claimant have to prove the existence of a psychiat-
ric injury through expert evidence; they also must prove foreseeability of mental 
harm.  Third, given the technological advancements and medical knowledge, it is 
foreseeable that people will suffer mental harm.  Fourth, mental harm is equal to 
physical harm and it is unlikely that the courts will limit recovery if 10,000 people 
are physically injured through the negligence of the defendant.  Finally, as has been 
recognised by the Ipp Report, the drawing of arbitrary lines is not good policy, as it 
will result in inconsistent and unfair results, as it did in Alcock.13  Consequently, the 
‘floodgates’ arguments are inappropriate and prevent recovery even in genuine 
cases.             
 
 
III A SHORT HISTORY LESSON IN NERVOUS SHOCK 
 
One of the first cases to consider recovery for ‘nervous shock’ was Victorian Rail-
ways Commissioner v Coultas.14  A gatekeeper on a level crossing had negligently 
left the gate open, allowing Mr and Mrs Coultas to cross when the train was ap-
proaching.  They narrowly avoided the train, but Mrs Coultas suffered psychiatric 
injury as a result of the near miss.  Whilst initially successful, on appeal, the Privy 
Council held that damages arising from mere sudden horror, unaccompanied by any 
                                                        
12
 Butler, above n 10. 
13
 Law Reform Committee, above n 4, 141 
14
 (1888) 1 3 App. Cas. 222. 
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physical injury, but occasioning psychiatric illness, could not be considered a con-
sequence, which would follow from a negligent gatekeeper.15     
 
The defendant in Coultas argued that there had to be some contemporaneous physi-
cal impact before recovery should be allowed for psychiatric injury.  Although the 
Privy Council did not require physical impact, various subsequent authorities cited 
‘physical impact’ as the explanation for its refusal to allow recovery.   
 
In Dulieu v White16 Justice Kennedy held that a person could claim for psychiatric 
injury only if they were themselves within the range of potential physical harm.17  
Kennedy J stated that recovery for nervous shock will only be allowed if the injury 
arose “from a reasonable fear of immediate personal injury to oneself.”18  This 
limitation was later relaxed by the Court of Appeal in Hambrook v Stokes,19 where a 
mother was allowed recovery after suffering psychiatric illness from anticipated 
injury to her children, even though she did not observe her children being harmed.  
Mrs Hambrook eventually discovered that her daughter Mabel was seriously in-
jured.  In allowing recovery however the court excluded recovery where the nerv-
ous shock was suffered following third party communication of the incident.  Lord 
Oliver in the 1992 decision of Alcock, espoused the proposition that claimants 
suffering psychiatric illness may recover if they viewed the incident with their “own 
visual perception” rather than through third party communication.20  This require-
ment of “own visual perception” is the primary threat to recovery for ‘nervous 
shock’ by claimants who view distressing events on television broadcasts because 
viewing through this medium is unlikely to be equivalent to ‘own visual percep-
tion’.   
 
Despite the courts’ refusal to award recovery where a claimant was not in physical 
danger21 or where they did not actually see a loved one in physical (or perceived) 
danger, the case law makes it clear that the law is on the move.  This was illustrated 
in the case of Mount Isa Mines v Pusey22 where the High Court allowed an em-
ployee to recover for psychiatric illness which arose from his attempts to assist two 
fellow employees who were ‘just burnt up’, through the negligence of the employer.  
Recovery was allowed despite the plaintiff being unacquainted with the burn vic-
tims, who later died, and he himself not being in any physical danger.  It appeared 
from most of the judgments that the relationship between the tortfeasor and the 
plaintiff was relevant to the issue of liability.23  The court did not place special 
restrictions on recovery for nervous shock, and this was clear in the judgments of 
                                                        
15
 Ibid 225. 
16
 [1901] 2 KB 669. 
17
 Dulieu v White [1901] 2 KB 669, 675.  
18
 Ibid.  
19
 [1925] 1 KB 141. 
20
 Alcock v Chief Constable of South Yorkshire Police [1992] 1 AC 310, 412. 
21
 Bourhill v Young (1943) AC 92. 
22
 (1970) 125 CLR 383. 
23
 Ibid 389 (Barwick CJ), 391 (McTiernan J), 392 (Menzies J), 399 (Windeyer J) and 411 (Walsh J).   
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Justices Windeyer24 and Walsh.25  The law was therefore developing in incremental 
steps to meet new situations of psychiatric injury, at least until the decision of the 
House of Lords in McLoughlin v O’Brian.26  
 
IV LORD WILBERFORCE AND THE THREE                                 
‘CONTROL MECHANISMS’ 
 
Lord Hoffman in White v Chief Constable of South Yorkshire Police27 summarised 
McLoughlin v O’Brian28 and its relevance to ‘nervous shock’ succinctly.  He said 
that the law “came within a hair’s breadth” of establishing foreseeability as the sole 
criterion for liability for psychiatric injury.  It was ‘one of those cases in which one 
feels that a slight change to the composition of the Appellate Committee would 
have set the law on a different course.’29  He was referring to the fact that out of the 
five Law Lords, two were against establishing additional limits (Lords Bridge and 
Scarman) and two were for establishing greater controls for recovery (Lords 
Wilberforce and Edmund-Davies), whilst Lord Russell failed to provide a clear 
opinion on this issue.  Lord Wilberforce’s judgment was adapted in England and by 
the Australian High Court, although only to a limited extent.30  This led to an era of 
blind faith in His Lordship’s pronouncement, even though it was not in the major-
ity, as far as his reasoning was concerned,31 producing unfair and inconsistent 
results.  
 
It is necessary to examine the McLoughlin case in some depth to obtain an under-
standing of why television viewers may be barred from recovery for nervous shock.  
The litigation arose from horrific circumstances.  The defendant’s negligent driving 
had caused a road accident in which the plaintiff’s daughter was killed and her 
husband and other children had been badly injured. The plaintiff was not at the 
scene and did not hear of the accident until two hours later.  She did not see its 
consequences until she went to the hospital.  She was allowed to recover for the 
psychiatric injury she suffered, as it was held that she had arrived at the ‘aftermath’, 
which included the hospital where the victims were still effectively in the state they 
were in after the accident.  Despite the lack of uniformity in the reasoning, the 
entire House of Lords allowed the appeal in her favour.  We will begin with the 
judgment that had the most impact upon recovery for ‘nervous shock’, that of Lord 
Wilberforce.  
 
                                                        
24
 Ibid 401.  
25
 Ibid 392. 
26
 Oliver Segal and J M Williams, ‘Psychiatric Injury, Policy and the House of Lords’ (1999) Journal of 
Personal Injuries Litigation 102, 103. 
27
 [1998] 3 WLR 1509, 1548-9. 
28
 [1983] 1 AC 410. 
29
 Ibid. 
30
 Jaensch v Coffey (1984) 155 CLR 549 (‘Jaensch’). 
31
 United Kingdom, Liability for Psychiatric Injury, Law Committee Report No 249 (1998). 
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Lord Wilberforce from the outset32 sought to limit recovery in psychiatric injury 
cases – ‘…the boundaries of a man’s responsibility for acts of negligence have to be 
fixed as a matter of policy.’  He added – ‘…foreseeability must be accompanied and 
limited by the law’s judgment as to persons who ought, according to its standards of 
value or justice, to have been in contemplation.’  He was so heavily influenced by 
policy against a wider extension;33 it is little wonder that he felt it necessary to 
impose the three limits to be considered.   
 
His Lordship pronounced the limits on psychiatric injury cases,34 which until re-
cently would have barred recovery by television viewers.  The Californian Supreme 
Court had formulated three similar factors that were to be assessed as part of rea-
sonable foreseeability in Dillon v Legg.35  First, Lord Wilberforce placed a limit on 
the class of persons who may claim.  Whilst he said that ‘…the closer the tie (not 
merely in relationship but in care) the greater the claim for consideration’, he rec-
ognised only the closest of family ties (that of parent and child and husband and 
wife).  
 
Second, he required proximity to the accident “in both time and space.”  This he 
defined as direct and immediate sight or hearing of the incident or the aftermath 
(i.e. those who come upon the scene very soon).  This would most likely rule out 
even claimants with close tie and affection unless they came upon the immediate 
aftermath.  This may mean, for example, that one sibling who is in a close relation-
ship to the victim is likely to recover if he/she was at the scene, but another sibling 
who is in a similar close relationship may be refused recovery merely because 
he/she was not at the scene or its immediate aftermath.  This approach defies logic.   
 
The final ‘control mechanism’ was that shock caused by way of communication 
was not recoverable.  This would exclude nervous shock caused by communication 
of a distressing event by a third party, which may or may not include a television 
broadcast.  On a positive note however his Lordship refused to rule out36 the possi-
bility that a simultaneous television broadcast may be equivalent to sight or hearing 
of the event or its immediate aftermath.   
 
Despite the three limitations on recovery, it is unlikely that even Lord Wilberforce 
meant for them to be applied without flexibility:  
 
It is necessary to consider three elements inherent in any claim.  I believe 
that these indications [i.e. the three factors], imperfectly sketched, and 
certainly to be applied with common sense to individual situations in 
their entirety [represent existing law]…37 
 
                                                        
32
 McLoughlin v O’Brian [1983] 1 AC 410, 420. 
33
 Ibid 421. 
34
 Ibid 422. 
35
 (1968) 441 P 2d 912. 
36
 McLoughlin v O’Brian (1983) 1 AC 410, 423. 
37
 Ibid. 
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This warning therefore places serious doubts over the reliance on His Lordship’s 
judgment as the reason for restricting recovery.  His Lordship’s repeated warnings 
were not heeded and these rules appear to have been applied stringently, at least 
until the recent cases of Annetts and Gifford.   
  
Similarly, Lord Edmund-Davies refused to allow foreseeability to be the sole de-
terminant of negligence actions but he did not provide details of other tests that 
should be applied.  Whilst his Lordship demanded more controls, he was uneasy 
with inflexible rules and was rather persuaded by public policy.  He did not how-
ever appear to have explicitly accepted Lord Wilberforce’s three control mecha-
nisms.  
 
In contrast to the stance of Lords Wilberforce and Edmund-Davies, Lord Scarman 
was not convinced that strict rules were required.38  He noted that ‘space, time, 
distance, the nature of the injuries sustained, and the relationship of the plaintiff to 
the immediate victim of the accident, are factors to be weighed, but not legal limita-
tions, when the test of reasonable foreseeability is to be applied.’39  He wished for 
principles to be guiding lights but not tyrannical masters in their own right.  Yet he 
predicted social and financial problems if ‘…damages for “nervous shock” should 
be made available to persons other than parents and children who without seeing or 
hearing the accident, or being present in the immediate aftermath, suffer shock in 
consequence of it.’  Lord Wilberforce’s tests therefore would have a bearing on 
recovery, although they would not necessarily preclude a claim.40  Whilst recovery 
is more probable for the television viewers, the absence of the aforementioned 
factors would create doubt over a successful claim, especially in the case of those 
who did not perceive the distressing event and those who do not fall within the 
close family criterion. 
 
Finally, Lord Bridge decided against placing inflexible rules upon recovery and 
held that ‘…to make the defendant liable for reasonably foreseeable psychiatric 
illness caused by his negligence’ would not be imposing a crushing burden on him 
out of proportion to his moral responsibility.41  He pointed out that ‘...to draw a line 
by reference to any [strict rules] must impose a largely arbitrary limit of liability.’42  
He was the most liberal of the Lords and he summed up his position aptly – ‘…if 
asked where the thing is to stop, I should answer…where in the particular case, the 
good sense of the judge, enlightened by progressive awareness of mental illness, 
decides.’43  Needless to say, television viewers are unlikely to be barred under this 
approach merely because they were not at the scene.  Undoubtedly, this criterion 
provides little certainty but appears to be in the spirit of developing the common 
law.  
                                                        
38
 Ibid 430. 
39
 Ibid 431. 
40
 Michael Jones, ‘Liability for Psychiatric Illness – More Principle, Less Subtlety?’ (1995) 4 Web 
Journal of Current Legal Issues 1. <http://webjcli.ncl.ac.uk/article4/jones4.html> 
41
 McLoughlin v O’Brian (1983) 1 AC 410, 441. 
42
 Ibid 442. 
43
 Ibid 443. 
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Whilst there was some judicial support for recovery by television viewers, the 
‘control mechanisms’ of Lord Wilberforce do not appear to favour such an ap-
proach.  If his approach was adopted television viewers would be unlikely to re-
cover despite the fact that his Lordship did not close the door on such claimants. 
Since ensuing cases adopted the control mechanisms in one form or another, recov-
ery is unlikely unless the claimants arrived at the ‘immediate aftermath’ of the 
crash.   
 
The first High Court case to consider McLoughlin in Australia was Jaensch.44 The 
facts of Jaensch are somewhat similar to McLoughlin. The respondent’s (Mrs 
Coffey) husband suffered serious injury through the negligence of Mr Jaensch.  Mrs 
Coffey was not present at the scene of the accident but arrived at the hospital soon 
after.  She developed psychiatric illness through what she saw and heard at the 
hospital.  She was allowed recovery by the High Court.  
 
Chief Justice Gibbs interpreted McLoughlin as ‘…part of the logical progression of 
the development of the law already evidenced in the earlier authorities and correct 
in principle.’45  According to His Honour, the law had been removing ‘…the old 
and irrational limitations…’ one by one and McLoughlin had advanced it one step 
further.  With regards to the three elements, he stated - “I would with respect, re-
serve my opinion as to the correctness of some of Lord Wilberforce’s com-
ments…in particular on his statement that there must be a close proximity in space 
as well as in time and that ‘the shock must come through sight or hearing of the 
event or of its immediate aftermath.  The law must continue to proceed in this 
area step by cautious step.’46  Whilst his Honour required more than foreseeability 
he was unwilling to be bound by unnecessary and inflexible rules that would ham-
per development.  This is a step closer to accepting liability for claimants who 
suffer ‘nervous shock’ as a result of watching distressing events on television, if 
they are in a close relationship with the immediate victim. 
  
In a short judgment, Justice Murphy allowed recovery, stating as his main reason 
that “in the absence of legislation limiting recovery, I am not satisfied that there are 
acceptable reasons of public policy for limiting recovery here.”47  He did not dis-
cuss the Lord Wilberforce factors and he did not expressly approve them.   
 
Justice Brennan took a broadly similar approach and discussed in great detail public 
policy.  He said that on his wide interpretation – ‘the thing will stop where good 
sense in the finding of facts stops it.’48  He defined ‘shock as’:  
 
                                                        
44(1984) 155 CLR 549. 
45
 Ibid 552. 
46
 Ibid 555. 
47
 Ibid 558. 
48
 Ibid 572. 
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…the sudden sensory perception – that is by seeing, hearing or touching – 
of a person, thing or event, which is so distressing that the perception of 
the phenomenon affronts or insults the plaintiff’s mind and causes a recog-
nisable psychiatric illness.  A psychiatric illness induced by mere knowl-
edge of a distressing fact is not compensable; perception by the plaintiff of 
the distressing phenomenon is essential.49 
 
His Honour concluded thus:  
 
The limitations suggested by Lord Wilberforce…are appropriately taken 
into account by the general principles of causation and reasonable foresee-
ability.  There are no other elements which might preclude a duty of care 
arising where the kind of damage caused by a defendant’s conduct is 
shock-induced psychiatric illness and that kind of damage is reasonably 
foreseeable.50  
 
Despite leaving the class and the definition of aftermath open,51 His Honour recog-
nised that it would be in exceptional cases that persons outside the close relation-
ship,52 not directly perceiving the event or its immediate aftermath,53 would result in 
recovery.  He said: 
 
…when the scene of an accident is left behind, and the perception of some 
later phenomenon induces psychiatric illness…the factual difficulties in 
the way of establishing negligence occasioning nervous shock are greatly 
increased.54   
 
It appears that a secondary victim may recover provided they perceive the primary 
victim in their post-accident ‘distressing appearance’ and that appearance would 
fairly be regarded as the result of the defendant’s carelessness or the reasonably 
foreseeable result of it.55  As far as our claims are concerned, unless a television 
viewer arrives at the immediate aftermath of the distressing events that they viewed 
on television, they will be unable to recover.   
 
On the other hand, Justice Deane set out additional proximity requirements,56 but he 
did not expressly restrict recovery to the ‘Wilberforce principles’.  He required 
presence at the scene or immediate aftermath.57  The preferable view would seem to 
be that a person who has suffered reasonably foreseeable psychiatric injury as the 
result of contemporaneous observation at the scene of the accident is within the area 
                                                        
49
 Ibid 567. 
50
 Ibid 577.   
51
 Ibid 570. 
52
 Ibid. 
53
 Ibid. 
54
 Ibid. 
55
 Ibid 577. 
56
 Ibid 585, 586. 
57
 Ibid 605, 606. 
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which the common law accepts that the requirement of proximity is satis-
fied…regardless of his particular relationship with the injured person. 
 
According to His Honour, the aftermath extends to ‘…wherever sound may carry 
and to wherever flying debris may land.’  ‘In a modern society, the aftermath also 
extends to the ambulance taking an injured person to hospital for treatment and to 
the hospital itself during the period of immediate post-accident treatment.’58  Unless 
the television viewer is able to attend the ‘immediate aftermath’ he/she will be 
unable to recover. His Honour did however concede that ‘communicated nervous 
shock’ might be recoverable.   
 
It is somewhat difficult to discern an acceptable reason why a rule based on public 
policy should preclude recovery for psychiatric injury sustained by a wife and 
mother who is so devastated by being told on the telephone that her husband and 
children have all just been killed that she is unable to attend at the scene; while 
permitting recovery for the reasonably, but perhaps less readily, foreseeable psychi-
atric injury sustained by a wife who attends at the scene of the accident or its im-
mediate aftermath at the hospital where her husband has suffered serious but not 
fatal injuries.59   
 
Whilst his Honour did not see the necessity to deal with the issue further in the 
present case, his judgment creates the best hope for recovery. 
 
Finally, Justice Dawson embraced the limits set by Lord Wilberforce – ‘…in order 
to be compensable, nervous shock must not only be reasonably foreseeable; it must 
also fall within bounds set as a matter of policy.  See McLoughlin v O’Brian per 
Lord Wilberforce at pp. 420-422.’60  
 
What are the conclusions one can draw from Jaensch as far as the television claim-
ants are concerned?  Other than Deane J, Murphy J (who did not adopt the Wilber-
force principles), and perhaps Brennan J through his foreseeability/causation 
approach, no other judge appears to have given support to recovery for ‘communi-
cated nervous shock’.  All others have imported some limitations, although most 
refer to them as ‘factors’ to be taken into account.  Having taken these factors into 
account, television viewers are unlikely to recover under the principles of this case 
unless simultaneous broadcasts are held to be a ‘direct perception’ of the event or 
its immediate aftermath.  This approach differentiates between victims on the basis 
of where they were and by assuming, without the support of medical evidence, that 
presence at the scene was more likely to cause psychiatric illness than the commu-
nication of the distressing news.  Until Annetts and Gifford such an approach was 
judicially accepted and would have ruled out our ‘television claimants’. 
 
                                                        
58
 Ibid 607, 608. 
59
 Ibid 608, 609. 
60
 Ibid 613. 
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In Annetts and Gifford, the High Court of Australia explored the status of the ‘con-
trol mechanisms’ in the law of negligence, as it stands today.  These two cases 
appear to have breathed life into the possibility of success by the television claim-
ants.  Whilst these two cases are vital to this paper, it is important to first discuss the 
House of Lords decision in the litigation following the Hillsborough stadium disas-
ter in the UK.  The facts of Alcock necessitated the consideration of recovery by 
claimants who suffer nervous shock from communication of the distressing event 
through the medium of television.  
 
 
V ALCOCK – WILL THE COURTS ACKNOWLEDGE RECOVERY? 
 
The House of Lords in Alcock generally adopted the limitations upon recovery 
placed in McLoughlin by Lord Wilberforce and some were less liberal in their 
application of the principles.  The Law Lords introduced the three control mecha-
nisms as factors to be considered in addition to foreseeability.  This is especially 
true of Lord Keith,61 Lord Ackner,62 Lord Oliver,63 and Lord Jauncey.64  It is impor-
tant to note however that whilst some Law Lords discussed the factors as part of 
reasonable foreseeability, others saw them as controls operating in addition to 
foreseeability.   
 
Lord Wilberforce had regarded the three elements as tests of foreseeability rather 
than further factors to be satisfied.65 Of more importance is the refusal by the House 
of Lords to allow television viewers to recover for psychiatric illness.  We will now 
discuss the facts of Alcock and then discuss the plight of our claimants.   
 
The claims were for psychiatric injury suffered by close relatives (i.e. siblings, 
children, and some less close relationships such as a fiancé and grandparents) of 
some of those who perished at the Hillsborough Stadium disaster during a soccer 
match.  Of particular relevance to our discussion are the secondary victims who 
viewed the events as they unfolded on simultaneous television broadcast.  None of 
the claimants were successful for various reasons and the reasons for denial are an 
important guide for ‘television claimants’.  
 
According to Lord Keith, the viewing of television broadcasts could not be 
‘…equiparated with the viewer being within sight or hearing of the event or its 
immediate aftermath.’  He added – ‘…nor can the scenes reasonably be regarded as 
giving rise to shock, in the sense of sudden assault on the nervous system.’66  This 
                                                        
61
 Ibid 396. 
62
 Ibid 400. 
63
 Ibid 406. 
64
 Ibid 419. 
65
 Segal and Williams, above n 26, 108. 
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was because none of the scenes depicted suffering of recognisable individuals, as 
the broadcasting code of ethics excluded such broadcasts and this state of affairs 
was known to the defendant.67  His Lordship also held that there was no evidence of 
close ties of love and affection in the relationships in the case (i.e. of brother and 
brother-in-law).68  This was despite him not having limited the class of persons who 
may come within such a close relationship and considering the ‘Wilberforce rules’ 
as only factors to be taken into account.69  Hence, it appears as though claimants 
who suffer ‘nervous shock’ from viewing a broadcast may recover if ‘suffering by 
recognisable individuals’ was depicted and the broadcasting guidelines did not bar 
such pictures. As Des Butler has pointed out however, to base ‘nervous shock’ 
claims on broadcasting ethics is absurd, to say the least.70    
 
This was the same line of reasoning adopted by Lord Jauncey.  His Lordship added:  
 
…a television programme such as that transmitted from Hillsborough in-
volves cameras at different viewpoints showing scenes all of which no one 
individual would see, edited pictures and a commentary superimposed.  I 
do not consider that such a programme is equivalent to actual sight or hear-
ing at the accident or its immediate aftermath.71   
 
He, nevertheless, refused to comment on the Nolan L.J example of children in a 
balloon (explained below), except to say ‘…to essay any comprehensive definition 
would be a fruitless exercise.’72  As Des Butler has argued, the camera angles do 
not necessarily lessen the impact upon a viewer.  A zoom view, different angle or 
commentary may render the events more horrific for a television viewer than a 
percipient witness in another part of a ground relying on the naked eye.73  
 
Lord Ackner also held that the claimants could not recover because of the code of 
ethics.74  On a positive note, however, his Lordship did not rule out the possibility 
that simultaneous television broadcasts may be equated with “sight or hearing of the 
event or its immediate aftermath.”75  He cited the example, given by Nolan L.J in 
the Court of Appeal, where recovery may be allowed.  This involved the simultane-
ous broadcasting of a special event of children travelling in a balloon, being 
watched by adoring parents, and the balloon suddenly bursting into flames.76  He 
further noted that “many other such situations could be imagined where the impact 
of the simultaneous television pictures would be as great, if not greater, than the 
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actual sight of the accident.”77  His Lordship refused to place limitations on the 
‘close relationship’ class,78 although he did not allow siblings to recover (because 
they could not prove love).79  If the claim by a person who lost two brothers in 
circumstances as horrifying as those in the Hillsborough disaster was unsuccessful, 
it is difficult to envisage recovery by someone other than a parent or spouse.80   
 
Lord Oliver handed down a separate but almost identical decision to that of Lord 
Ackner, at least in relation to the television viewers.81  Despite the harshness of the 
actual decision there is a silver lining, at least for close relatives who view events as 
they unfold on television.  Lords Ackner and Oliver did not completely bar recov-
ery by television viewers.  Nevertheless, given that the viewing of people crushed in 
a stadium disaster was not horrific enough for their Lordships, it is difficult to 
assess what would actually be sufficient.  Perhaps a plane crash would be sufficient 
but even then the Law Lords appear to require direct perception of suffering by 
‘recognisable individuals’.   
 
VI THE REACTIONS TO ALCOCK 
 
The Alcock decision was widely criticised both in Britain and Australia.  Unfortu-
nately such fervent criticism did not alter general judicial attitude to nervous shock.  
The case of White82 demonstrated an unwillingness to depart from Alcock.  This was 
especially reflected by Lord Steyn, who at one point said – ‘the abolition or relaxa-
tion of the special rules governing the recovery of damages for psychiatric harm 
would greatly increase the class of persons who can recover damages in tort.’83   
 
In Britain the most notable attack came from the UK Law Commission.84 The 
central recommendation of the Commission was that the law must abandon the 
requirements of “closeness in time and space” and “shock.”  It is clear that the 
Commission was persuaded by the arbitrary nature of judicial decisions based on 
these control mechanisms and upon the basis of advice received regarding causation 
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and psychiatric injury.85  Whilst the Commission proposed to remove these restric-
tions through legislation, it was unwilling to abandon the requirement of ‘reason-
able foreseeability’.  It rejected the approach taken in three Australian states, which 
did not require such a requirement once the relationship in the statute had been 
satisfied.86   
 
The requirement of ‘close ties of love and affection’ was however preserved.  The 
Commission recommended that it should be given statutory footing because certain 
circumstances would give rise to an irrebuttable presumption that a relationship is 
close enough to result in psychiatric injury.  Spouse, parent/child, sibling, and 
cohabitant of two years or more (including homosexual cohabitants) came within 
such a relationship.  The Commission did not specifically exclude other relation-
ships, so recovery may be possible if a close tie of love and affection were to be 
proved.  The Commission did make further recommendations but they will not be 
discussed given the limitations of this paper.   
 
It is interesting to note that these recommendations have not as yet been given 
statutory footing.  If they were to be legislated, it is likely that recovery for ‘com-
municated nervous shock’ would be allowed in the UK.  Bystanders however are 
unlikely to be able to prove a close tie of love and affection and are therefore 
unlikely to recover.  Even if these recommendations are adopted, the ‘code of 
ethics’ reasoning offered by the House of Lords may still place the recovery by 
television viewers at issue.  
 
Des Butler, in Australia, has provided four reasons which undermine the ‘Code of 
Ethics’ argument espoused by their Lordships in Alcock, and bolster the case for 
recovery by television viewers.87  First, it is dangerous, ‘…to place such reliance 
upon the Code of Ethics for the purposes of devising limitations of liability in effect 
amounts to an abdication of the determination to an outside body.’88  He asks where 
the law would be if the Broadcasting authority decides to change the code of ethics.   
 
Second, breach of the code of ethics may not always amount to a novus actus inter-
veniens, especially if ‘it is the very kind of occurrence that might be expected to 
happen’.  Mr Butler quite correctly argues that in ‘…the modern days of keen 
competition between media operators, it is not unusual to expect broadcasters to 
breach the Code of Ethics from time to time.’89  Certainly applying the statutory test 
for duty of care, it is not an ‘insignificant risk’.90   
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Third, even a broadcaster complying with the Code may still inadvertently broad-
cast ‘suffering by recognisable individuals’.  It is clear from the judgments that the 
main reason for the claims by television viewers failing was because such suffering 
was not broadcast.  One of the examples he provides as an inadvertent breach is 
where a person is identifiable by the role played in the incident, such as where the 
camera is following the progress of a particular car during a motor race, which due 
to the negligence of a mechanic is involved in an accident.  
 
Finally, Mr Butler points out, that a particular event may be broadcast live all over 
the world and the foreign country’s Code of Ethics, if there is one, may be different 
to the country in which the broadcast is filmed.  This places further doubt over the 
validity of the ‘Alcock’ reasoning, especially given that their Lordships did not limit 
the class of persons who may prove a ‘close relationship’ to the primary victim and 
a majority were willing to allow recovery in some horrific cases.  Moreover, the 
Australian cases have focused on the relationship between the tortfeasor and the 
secondary victim, as compared to the English cases, which have relied on the rela-
tionship between the primary and the secondary.91   
 
The door may not have been completely slammed in the face of recovery for psy-
chiatric injury based on television broadcasts, especially given that some believed 
the Alcock decision addressed the incapability of the law to deal with injuries on a 
mass scale.92  Whilst the case of Alcock was somewhat detrimental to claims by 
television viewers the Australian High Court cases of Tame and Annetts and Gif-
ford, and Statutes in Australian States, have given some hope of recovery.  
 
 
VII ANNETTS AND GIFFORD – THE PENDULUM SWINGS 
 
The facts of Annetts93 will be considered before embarking on a discussion of this 
somewhat confusing decision.  Mr & Mrs Annetts agreed to send their 16-year-old 
son, James, to work as a jackaroo, on the assurance of the employer (Australian 
Stations) that James would work under constant supervision.  This promise was not 
kept and James was sent to work alone 100 km away (near Halls Creek).  After 
three months the manager learnt that James had disappeared and suspected that he 
was in grave danger of injury or death.  Three days later, on being told of James’ 
disappearance on the telephone by a police officer, Mr Annetts collapsed.  James’s 
parents made several trips to Halls Creek and some of his belongings were found in 
extensive searches that were carried out following James’s disappearance. Five 
months later, his body was found in the desert.  He had died of dehydration, exhaus-
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tion and hypothermia, when his vehicle broke down.  Mr and Mrs Annetts suffered 
psychiatric illness upon hearing that James had disappeared and later when told of 
his death. 
 
Each of the judgments will now be analysed to support the contention that televi-
sion viewers are not completely excluded from recovery for ‘nervous shock’, at 
least where there exists a ‘special relationship’. Chief Justice Gleeson stated that the 
‘Wilberforce controls’ should not be applied inflexibly.94  Contrary to previous 
authority, he held that the tests were only factors to be considered rather than de-
terminative of the issue.95  Gleeson CJ, however, did not deal with the class of 
persons who would be allowed recovery.  His Honour appeared to emphasise the 
relationship between the plaintiff and the defendant rather than the relationship 
between the plaintiff and the injured person.96  He did however state that the rela-
tionship between the claimant and the injured was not relevant to Annetts because it 
concerned parent/child relationship (long accepted class for recovery).97  
 
Justice Gaudron appeared to cast serious doubts over the status of the ‘control 
mechanisms’ as preconditions to recovery.98  Like Gleeson CJ, she views the com-
plete abolition of control factors other than ‘foreseeability’ as dangerous.99  Despite 
leaving the door open to the possibility of recovery for ‘told nervous shock’ she 
indicated that the ‘direct perception’ rule would be relevant unless there was a 
special relationship between the potential litigants.100  She did not limit the special 
relationships.101   
 
Her Honour however refused to rule out recovery by a class of people other than 
those having a close tie of love and affection with the immediate victim.  Having 
identified the tests for recovery in Jaensch, which included recovery for those in 
close relationships, she goes on to say that ‘to treat those…identified in Jaensch v 
Coffey as the only persons who may recover for negligently caused psychiatric 
harm is…productive of anomalous and illogical consequences.’102  As a result, 
those in not so close relationships may not be excluded from recovery merely 
because they are not in a traditional relationship of close love and affection.   
 
Justice McHugh, on the other hand, held it was unnecessary to examine the status of 
the three prerequisites.103  He nevertheless stated that there was no need to satisfy 
additional requirements if there was a pre-existing relationship.104  This is in line 
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with his rejection of proximity as an additional test to foreseeability.105  He places a 
different duty upon the employee/employer relationship and like Justices Gaudron 
and Gleeson appears to embrace the need for a pre-existing relationship.106  His 
Honour does not, however, shed any further light on this issue. 
 
His Honour does not pay much attention to the class of claimants who may recover. 
He appears to have isolated this case as one arising from employer/employee rela-
tionship.  Perhaps this was not the appropriate case to define ‘close ties of love and 
affection’ given that the parent/child relationship has long been recognised as 
worthy of recognition.  Any such discussion would not have been central to the 
issue at hand.  His Honour however took the opportunity to be more expansive in 
Gifford.   
 
Justices Gummow and Kirby, in a joint judgment, held that it was time for re-
accommodation of the competing interests that are in play in nervous shock cases, 
given the advances in medicine which have allowed for recognition of genuine 
cases.107  Their Honours succinctly state the status of the three rules in Australian 
nervous shock law – “none of these three control mechanisms has been accepted by 
this court as a pre-condition to liability for negligently inflicted psychiatric 
harm.”108  Throughout their judgment there is a sustained and fervent attack upon 
the three rules.109  This is perhaps the most favourable judgment of all given its 
interpretation of Alcock, which if accepted in Australia may bar recovery for televi-
sion viewers.  They identify the lack of direct perception in Alcock as the reason for 
the English court denying recovery to the claimants who suffered on account of 
viewing the events on television.110  Based on this interpretation of Alcock, a televi-
sion claimant is likely to recover because their Honours reject the ‘direct percep-
tion’ rule as a precondition, on the basis that it produces inconsistent and 
inequitable results.111   
 
Justice Hayne discusses in detail the pros and cons of the three rules and their 
application.  He defines the three rules somewhat differently to the other judges – 
(i) limits on the class of persons who may recover (ii) shock or sudden sensory 
perception and normal fortitude, and (iii) allowing for only psychiatric harm rather 
than emotional distress.112  He regards the second limit as a factor but not a pre-
condition, but acknowledges the dangers of accepting reasonable foreseeability as 
the sole test of recovery.  He sees the need for ‘some control mechanisms, beyond 
foreseeability of psychiatric harm...’113 He held that ‘normal fortitude’ and the 
distinction between psychiatric injury and emotional distress were the most impor-
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tant control mechanisms and refused to abandon them.114  He further refused to treat 
physical and psychiatric injuries differently.115   
 
Finally, Justice Callinan summarised ‘nervous shock’ law,116 and appears to have 
extended the aftermath rule to include situations where the news is “communicated 
to [the plaintiff] as soon as reasonable practicable, and before he or she has or 
should reasonably have reached a settled state of mind about it.”  This is likely to 
include viewers who watch the events unfold on live television. This was however 
subject to a qualifying factor, which was the requirement of a special or close 
relationship between the tortfeasor, the claimant and the primary victim.  The An-
netts case was seen to be an example of this special relationship.  Given that a close 
relationship needs to exist between the primary victim and the plaintiff, it is 
unlikely that bystanders will be able to recover although there have been no limits 
placed on such a class.  Furthermore, the decision is unclear as to whether a rela-
tionship other than that in Annetts would suffice. 
  
The Annetts decision has been clarified by the decision of Gifford117 and we now 
turn to that case for further assistance.  It is important to note that this case was 
decided by six judges rather than seven in Annetts, given the retirement of Justice 
Gaudron.  The facts of Gifford were stated in Chief Justice Gleeson’s judgment.  It 
involved the death of Mr Gifford, who was crushed to death by the negligence of 
his employer (Strang).  At the time the appellants (Mr Gifford’s children) were 
teenagers and were informed of the death later on the same day.  They did not 
witness the accident or its immediate aftermath.  Similar to Annetts therefore this is 
a case of ‘told nervous shock.’  Whilst not relevant to our discussion, Mr Gifford’s 
ex-wife failed in her claim for nervous shock, under s 4(1) (b) of the Law Reform 
(Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1944 (NSW), because she was held not to have 
suffered any psychiatric injury.  Her appeal failed.  Her children also failed at first 
instance and at the Court of Appeal.  Both these decisions were handed down before 
Annetts.  They did, however, succeeded in their appeal under common law (they did 
not come under the statutory provisions, to be discussed later), following the deci-
sion in Annetts.  
 
Chief Justice Gleeson held that the three ‘control mechanisms’ should be consid-
ered as factors rather than preconditions.118  Once again the pre-existing relationship 
between the plaintiff and the defendant was determinative of the issue.119  As far as 
the class is concerned, he utilised policy to justify the recognition of the par-
ent/child relationship as prima facie satisfying a close and intimate relationship.120   
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Similarly, Justice McHugh declared that since Annetts, common law liability might 
exist in the absence of direct perception of the distressing event or its immediate 
aftermath.121  The central question according to his Honour is whether the claimants 
are neighbours in the Atkinian sense of that term.122  The determination of this issue 
depends on ‘…whether the plaintiffs were so closely and directly affected by the 
tortfeasor’s relationship with the primary victim that the tortfeasor ought reasonably 
have them in contemplation when it directed its mind to the risk of injury to which 
it exposed the primary victim.’123  His Honour held that the answer to this question 
lay in the nature of the relationship between the plaintiffs and the primary victim 
(contrast this with Gleeson CJ, who held that the relevant relationship was that 
between the plaintiff and the defendant).124  It is also interesting to note that His 
Honour held that ‘…a duty to take care may exist even though the primary victim 
and the person suffering psychiatric harm had no pre-existing relationship.’125  One 
can therefore draw the conclusion that the class of claimants is not necessarily 
closed.   
 
His Honour’s view appears to have expanded the class of possible plaintiffs since 
his decision in Annetts.  Whilst not attempting to define the relationships which are 
characterised by that ‘closeness’, he allows for a case by case approach.  ‘Whether 
such a relationship exists in a particular case will often be a matter of evidence 
although…in some cases the nature of the relationship may be such that it may be 
presumed.’126  With regards to presumed relationships of love and affection he cites 
with approval the passage by Lord Keith of Kinkel in Alcock, where his Lordship 
provides as examples family relationships and close friendships.127  Justice McHugh 
also provides further examples of his own, such as parent and child, husband and 
wife, sibling and sibling, de facto partners and engaged couples.128  He goes on to 
say, ‘no doubt the parties to such relationships may sometimes be estranged’.129  
Despite this possibility, however, so commonly are these relationships close and 
loving that a wrongdoer must always have such persons in mind as neighbours.  To 
require such persons in such relationships to prove the closeness and loving nature 
of the relationship would be a waste of curial resources in the vast majority of 
cases.  What is even more comforting is his next statement – ‘…the wrongdoer 
must always have in mind any person who can establish a close and loving relation-
ship with the person harmed.’130  Despite having provided a detailed discussion, his 
Honour qualifies his statement – ‘Although a close relationship with the person 
harmed brings a person with the neighbour concept, it is not a necessary condition 
of that concept.’131   
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Whilst it is interesting to ponder whether Lord Atkin intended such a wide interpre-
tation of his test to include ‘communicated nervous shock’, Justice McHugh ap-
pears to indicate that the area of nervous shock will be given wider application in 
the future.  It is also fascinating to note that his Honour, like the rest of the bench, 
found that an employer owed a duty of care to the children of an employee to pro-
vide a safe place of employment for the employee.132   
 
According to Justices Gummow and Kirby, Annetts determined that ‘liability 
…does not depend upon satisfaction of an absolute requirement that a plaintiff 
‘directly perceive’ the relevant distressing incident or its “immediate aftermath.”133  
It did not however ‘…follow that a duty arises in all circumstances to which the 
control mechanism previously has been said to attach.  Indeed, it would be quite 
wrong to take it from Tame and Annetts that reasonable foreseeability of mental 
harm is the only condition of the existence of a duty of care.’134   
 
Justice Hayne’s judgment was along similar lines to the other judgments in that he 
interpreted Annetts as having decided that the lack of perception of a traumatic 
event is not fatal to a claim.135  Unlike others, however, he did not attempt to dis-
cuss what the factors should be except to note that new ones must replace the old 
controls.136  His reasons for imposing a duty upon the employer were similar to that 
of Justices Gummow and Kirby.137  In other words, he felt that control and vulner-
ability were required on top of reasonable foreseeability and those were the deter-
minative factors in Gifford.138  A closer reading of Hayne J’s judgment suggests that 
he felt bound by the Annetts decision to uphold a duty of care139 and it seems quite 
clear that the closeness of relationship between employer and employee and be-
tween children and employee were influential factors.140  Regardless it is interesting 
to note the evolution of a wholesale test, which was not evident in Annetts.  Pro-
vided that the bystanders can prove direct perception and establish love and affec-
tion (although doubtful) they may also be allowed to recover.   
 
Finally, Justice Callinan clearly said that he would ‘...adhere in this case to what 
[he] said in Tame.’141  Given that his decision in Annetts has already been discussed 
there is no need for further discussion, except to say that he would only remove the 
three control mechanisms provided there was a pre-existing relationship. 
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VIII CONCLUSIONS FROM ANNETTS AND GIFFORD 
 
According to Justice Gleeson, in Annetts and Gifford, it is clear that plaintiffs who 
base their nervous shock claims on injury or death to an employee of the tortfeasor 
are likely to recover, provided that they are in a close relationship with the victim.  
Recovery by television viewers may not however be so clear-cut.  First, His Honour 
held that the reason for establishing a duty of care was the existence of a pre-
existing duty between the plaintiffs and the defendant (the plaintiffs’ son was em-
ployed by the defendant who had given an assurance to look after their son).142  
Whilst it remains to be seen whether this would be a precondition to recovery for 
nervous shock, it appears as though it will at least be a key factor from Annetts and 
the recent case of Gifford.  Second, Gleeson CJ declared that the outcome of the 
case did not rely upon the so-called control mechanisms of ‘sudden shock’ and 
‘direct perception’ or ‘immediate aftermath.’  Consequently, the statements by 
Gleeson CJ regarding the controls should be treated as obiter rather than the basis of 
a communicated nervous shock claim.  Direct perception of the incident is unlikely 
to be satisfied by television broadcasts, even simultaneous live broadcasts as in 
Alcock.  Yet the fact that His Honour has demonstrated a willingness to abandon the 
strict rules implies that these claims are not necessarily doomed to fail.      
  
Justice Gaudron was reluctant to abandon the direct perception rule and this may 
mean that claimants, who watch events as they unfold on television, will not suc-
ceed in their claim.  She was however willing to make an exception where a special 
relationship exists between the claimant and the tortfeasor.  As will be evident when 
the statutes are discussed, once a ‘family relationship’ is established, the road to 
recovery will be less troublesome as the ‘direct perception’ will become a factor to 
be considered rather than a precondition.   
 
Justice Hayne’s approach leaves open the possibility of recovery, although one 
needs to be aware of his qualifying statements.143  He required more than reasonable 
foreseeability and the pre-existing relationship between the plaintiff and defendant 
was a decisive factor.144 He has elevated the relationship (between an employer and 
an employee’s family) in Annetts to one akin to employer/employee.145  Provided 
there is a close relationship recovery is highly likely, especially given that His 
Honour did not require presence at the scene.  
 
Whilst Justices Gummow and Kirby rejected ‘direct perception’ as a precondition, 
there are two reasons why not all claims by television viewers are likely to succeed.  
First, the justices indicated that although the three rules are no longer determinative 
of liability,146 they are still relevant factors as greater than foreseeability is re-
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quired.147 Second, the antecedent relationship between the claimant and defendant 
was the decisive factor.148 In other words, absent direct perception and sudden 
shock or a pre-existing relationship between the tortfeasor and the claimants, the 
claimants are unlikely to recover.  Their Honours did not make a definitive decision 
on the class of persons that may recover, indicating a preference for a flexible and 
case-by-case approach.  Additionally, they did not expressly exclude recovery by 
bystanders or restrict recovery to relationships arising out of the em-
ployer/employee relationships. 
 
Justice Callinan’s decision also appears to favour recovery provided there is a 
special relationship.  Whilst he considered the requirement of a ‘special relation-
ship’ as a necessary element for recovery, he extended the immediate aftermath to 
include communication of news.  His Honour was of the opinion that the communi-
cation must occur before the claimant reasonably reaches a settled state of mind and 
the communication must occur as soon as reasonably practicable.  Although live 
telecast may suffice, replays are unlikely to be considered sufficient. 
 
Finally, Justice McHugh took the opportunity to be more expansive in Gifford and 
did not exclude liability for communicated nervous shock.  He did however, like the 
others, place high emphasis on the relationship between the plaintiff and the pri-
mary victim.  
  
On the whole, whilst they were willing to keep an open mind to the possibility of 
recovery in all cases by removing inflexible rules, their Honours were careful not to 
expand the area of nervous shock without reason.  They required something more 
than mere foreseeability and in Gifford it presented itself in several forms.  They 
included policy (which included the protection of the young from serious harm),149 
and control of the circumstances, and therefore the risk of harm, by the employer 
and complete vulnerability of the children in being unable to protect themselves 
against the risk of psychiatric harm.150  In effect, this is similar to the ‘proximity’ 
factors required for breach of duty by a statutory authority.  Their Honours ap-
peared to be persuaded by the close relationships in both cases, clearly evincing an 
intention that a ‘close tie of love and affection’ is an important factor, to at least be 
considered. The claimants in Klein were certainly in a close relationship with the 
victim and the fact that all except one of the plaintiffs were not at the scene may not 
be detrimental to their claim.   
 
As Associate Professor Danuta Mendelson has noted, the Australian courts have 
been reluctant to place arbitrary limits upon the categories of claimants.151  In fact, 
the High Court has indicated a willingness to look at the matter on a case by case 
basis without closing the door forever on recovery by television viewers.  Perhaps it 
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is also appropriate to add that the High Court has taken on a more traditional role, 
that of developing the law upon a basis of “logical necessity”,152 the approach 
abandoned since the McLoughlin case, when it came to considering psychiatric 
injury cases.  Despite evidencing a more expansive approach to recovery for nerv-
ous shock, the High Court failed to provide an authoritative guide to the legal 
position in Australia.153 
 
IX STATUTES  
 
Developments in the area of ‘nervous shock’ have been primarily based in common 
law.  Most states in Australia have statutorily addressed ‘nervous shock’ in one 
form or another.  The original legislation in ACT,154 NSW,155 NT,156 South Austra-
lia,157 Tasmania,158 and Victoria159 provide that an action for personal injuries will 
not fail merely because the injury arose from nervous shock. It is interesting to note 
that one of the oldest, and also most comprehensive of these Acts, the Law Reform 
(Miscellaneous Provisions) Act, was passed in NSW as early as 1944.  The provi-
sions relating to nervous shock were enacted following the decision in Chester v 
Waverley Corporation160 that was subject to much community outrage.161 
 
Following the Ipp Report,162 some of the States (namely ACT,163 NSW,164 SA,165 
Tasmania,166 Victoria,167 and WA168) have recently introduced statutes that provide 
nervous shock extended coverage.  Whilst Justice Malpass noted in Burke v New 
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South Wales and Others169 the statutes have changed the position at common law it 
is clear from the terminology adopted by the legislature that it has not moved too far 
from the position espoused in Annetts and Gifford. Additionally, although the 
principles espoused are similar in flavour to Recommendations 33-38 of the Ipp 
Report, there are some discrepancies.  Before discussing the statutes in detail it is 
important to consider whether the legislation will exclude the operation of common 
law.   
  
Following the enactment of the 1944 NSW statute, there was doubt as to whether 
someone other than a family member could recover in NSW by reason of an ex-
pressio unius.170  The High Court, however, unanimously held in Gifford that the 
Act did not operate exclusively to the detriment of common law.  In other words, if 
a claimant is unable to satisfy the statutory requirements, they are not precluded 
from seeking common law remedies for ‘nervous shock’.  This proposition, how-
ever, is unlikely to apply under the new statutory scheme in NSW171 and other 
States given that most have impliedly or expressly excluded common law redress.  
For instance, s 32 of the Civil Liability Act 2002 (Tas) and s 5S of the Civil Liability 
Act 2002 (WA) also appear to impliedly exclude common law recovery by making 
the statutory provisions the sole source of recovery for mental harm.  The Victorian 
Wrongs Act 1958 espouses an intention that common law claims are also bound by 
the Act.172  
 
Despite the exclusion of the common law in some States, the statutes do appear to 
provide greater assistance to claims for psychiatric illness, provided they come 
within the class of ‘family members’.  For instance, section 31 of the Civil Law 
(Wrongs) Act 2002 of ACT allows recovery for ‘nervous shock’ to an extended 
class of claimants.173  Under s 29, the recoverable class includes grandparents, 
stepparents, someone acting in place of a parent, half-brothers and half-sisters, and 
grandchildren.  Despite rejecting the definition of the class of claimants who may 
recover, the Ipp Report did suggest a similar class to the one mentioned above with 
the exclusion of grandparents and grandchildren.174  Grandparents and grandchil-
dren have also not been included in the class by s 32 of the Tasmanian statute and s 
30 of the NSW Act.  Note however that WA and Victoria have not limited the class 
that may recover.   The Civil Liability Act 1936 of SA, Civil Liability Act 2002 of 
WA, and the Civil Liability Act 2002 of Tasmania, are similar to the ACT legisla-
tion.      
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The Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW) has incorporated common law principles.  
Section 30 does not require any person who is defined as a close family member to 
have been at the scene of the incident although it is a factor to be considered under s 
32.  This is a change from the 1944 NSW statute which required presence at the 
scene.  Under s 30(5), a close family member includes parents, grandparents, step-
parents, someone acting in place of a parent, spouses, half-brothers and half-sisters, 
and grandchildren.  Bystanders, however, are still precluded recovery unless they 
are at the scene.   
 
In Burke, Justice Malpass held that if the claimant is not a close family member of 
the victim, he/she must demonstrate a number of matters.175  There has to be an 
identifiable victim, and the claimant has to witness the victim being killed, injured 
or put in peril, at the scene.  In Burke the Plaintiff was not granted an extension of 
time to pursue his claim as the merits of the case did not warrant an extension, that 
is, he did not witness, at the scene, the victim (his friend) being killed, injured or 
put in peril. 
 
Despite having extended the meaning of the class of claimants, under section 32 of 
the new Act the plaintiff must prove that ‘…the defendant ought to have foreseen 
that a person of normal fortitude might, in the circumstances of the case, suffer a 
recognised psychiatric illness if reasonable care were not taken.’  The ‘circum-
stances of the case’, according to s 32(2), include – whether the mental harm was 
suffered as a result of sudden shock, whether the plaintiff was at the scene of the 
incident, the nature of the relationship between the plaintiff and the victim, and any 
pre-existing relationship between the plaintiff and the defendant.  The statutes in 
WA,176 Tasmania,177 and Victoria178 have all required additional factors; similar to 
the ones mentioned in NSW, to be taken into account.  In other words, the statutes 
have taken the common law factors into account.  This may mean that only those at 
the scene of the accident or its immediate aftermath will be allowed recovery.  
 
The new statutory schemes in NSW, Tasmania, Victorian and WA appear to have 
brought the legislative requirements for recovery in line with common law princi-
ples.  Whilst what used to be ‘control mechanisms’ are now seen to be factors to be 
taken into account, it is likely that these considerations may act much the same way 
to prevent recovery, unless there is a close family relationship between the victim 
and the claimants.  It is important to note that the High Court has allowed recovery, 
outside of the application of the three control mechanisms, only where there was 
some kind of pre-existing relationship between the plaintiff and the defendant.  
Even then it has been only allowed where the victim and the defendant were in an 
employee/employer relationship.  The High Court, however, has indicated a liking 
for the case by case approach, and this may ameliorate the operation of the factors 
to be considered.  Moreover, given that policy reasons for limiting recovery are no 
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longer valid, all is not lost for ‘television claimants’ who suffer from genuine 
‘nervous shock’. 
 
 
X CONCLUSION 
 
The law has advanced some way towards allowing recovery for nervous shock by 
television viewers.  Annetts and Gifford have provided a strong foundation for such 
claims.  It is however important to note that the majority of judges in Annetts and 
Gifford require ‘close ties of love and affection’ and a pre-existing relationship 
between the secondary victims and the tortfeasor was a decisive factor. Absent a 
pre-existing relationship, ‘direct perception’ is likely to be a factor to be considered.  
Similarly, legislation enacted in the various States and Territories in Australia 
require direct perception to be proved unless there is a family relationship between 
the ‘primary’ victim and the claimant. 
 
One must remember that although the common law and the legislature have demon-
strated an ability to adapt to community standards and medical and technological 
advances, it is a slow and arduous process.  At least now there is a willingness to 
break free of the so-called ‘control mechanisms’ of yesteryear.  Now, the Supreme 
Court of New South Wales has been called upon in Klein to determine just how far 
the law has progressed.  This responsibility should not be taken too lightly.      
 
 
